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Political economy first emerged in the eighteenth century, together with the 
rapid expansion of capitalism and the industrial and scientific revolutions. It 
was a new theory of society. But it also carried within it the unmistakable hall-
marks of a new cosmology: the mechanical world view.  
The inventors of this new cosmology were Kepler, Galileo, Hobbes, Locke, 
Hume, Leibniz, and, above all, Newton. The universe they created was a model 
machine, complete with a blueprint of systematic, immutable principles. These 
principles, or ‘laws of nature,’ may have been created by God. But once created, 
they were no longer messed with. The blueprint of nature was ironclad, forever. 
And because nature was both systematic and permanent, it could be deciphered 
and understood by science, and science alone.  
The socio-political implications of these ideas were truly revolutionary. 
With science taking the lead, politics and religion no longer had a say in matters 
of nature. In fact, the new cosmology implied that politics and religion should 
also have less to say in matters of society proper. If the ‘machine’ was the per-
fect model for nature, it also must be the perfect model for humans. The closer a 
society got to mechanical perfection, the closer it resembled God’s will, and the 
road to this perfection went not through the palace of the King or the Vatican of 
the Pope, but through the halls of science. 
These ideas are easy to discover in Adam Smith, the founding father of po-
litical economy. For Smith, who wrote in the eighteenth century, human beings 
were isolated bodies. They related to one another not organically, but mechani-
cally, through attraction and repulsion. The process was energized by ‘scarcity’ 
and ‘wants,’ and mediated through the mechanical forces of ‘supply’ and ‘de-
mand.’ To the naked eye, the interaction seemed accidental, a matter of chance 
for better or worse. But in fact, there was logic, and indeed order, in the chaos.  
The hierarchical structure of the ancient regime was replaced by the flat 
mechanism of the ‘invisible hand.’ Social order, which previously had been im-
posed by God through the clergy and the royalty, now was created by ‘competi-
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not to chaos but to equilibrium, and the same held true in society. Human be-
ings constantly collided and acted on each other through production and con-
sumption. Like natural bodies, they, too, were numerous and relatively small, 
and therefore none could take over and swallow the others. There was no visi-
ble guidance, and none was called for. The system functioned like clockworks, 
on its own. Indeed, it was ‘outside intervention’ – particularly by monarchs and 
commercial monopolies – which upset the spontaneous social order. And since 
this spontaneous order was the ultimate source of wealth, ‘government inter-
vention’ and other ‘restrictions’ were necessarily harmful and should be mini-
mized. The best system was one of laissez faire. 
Newton’s horizontal notion of ‘force and counterforce’ became the substi-
tute for vertical hierarchy, in the heavens as well as on earth. In France, Vol-
taire and Montesquieu found in his ideas a powerful alternative to the oppres-
sive French monarchy. Benjamin Franklin and other exiles imported these ideas 
to the United States under the guise of ‘checks and balance,’ which later ap-
peared as ‘countervailing powers.’  
During the nineteenth century, Newtonian ‘functions’ invaded every sci-
ence, natural and social. More and more phenomena were thought of in terms 
of a ‘mutual interdependency’ between two bodies. In economics, the key func-
tion was the relationship between ‘price’ and ‘quantity.’ Neoclassical econom-
ics, which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century as the new orthodoxy, 
made Bentham’s ‘calculus of pleasure and pain’ the main tool for understanding 
the fate of human societies.  
These original ideas of political economy have had an enormous influence 
and remain central to the way most people think of their society today. Among 
the many influences of political economy, three seem particularly crucial. The 
first was egocentrism. In their ‘natural state,’ went the argument, human beings 
lived separately, not collectively. In general, they knew what was best for them 
and they did not need supervision. Their freedom lied in the private sphere. The 
public sphere, by its very nature, was the realm of coercion and domination. 
Egocentrism was intimately link to a second idea, the market. The market 
was the method by which the private economy was finally ‘separated’ from pub-
lic politics. The process was hard and drawn out. Although human beings were 
egocentric in ‘their nature,’ it took time for this nature to manifest itself in the 
way they organized society. Early social life was collective, dependent and co-
ercive. As a consequence, most people were poor. It was only with the advent 
of individualism, the division of labour and mutual interaction that people grew 
more prosperous.  
The crucial mechanism in this development was the ‘market.’ Wherever the 
market came to rule, wealth and freedom multiplied. In societies where com-
mand and authority continued, so did poverty. It is of course true that even 
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work well only when they are voluntary; when they are limited to the provision 
of public goods and the repair of market failures; and, most importantly, when 
they are easy to undo. Otherwise, social relationships are best mediated through 
the market. The market is the most effective way to express what we want, to 
provide information, to spread technology, to increase efficiency. It is the finest 
defence against power and authoritarianism. It is the best democracy money 
can buy.  
The third, and perhaps most revolutionary idea of political economy was 
capital. In pre-capitalist societies, the conflict between slaves and masters, or 
between rulers and ruled, was always laid bare. In order to legitimate this con-
flict, there was always a need for an impersonal ‘third force’ – most commonly, 
religion. For this reason, Oriental peasants had to accept their despots as God’s 
incarnation on earth (Islam means ‘acceptance’ of God’s will and the punish-
ment of infidelity). Their Western counterparts were similarly forced to accept 
their kings, princes and lords – or risk Hell as promised by the clergy.  
The emergence of ‘capital’ offered a radically different alternative. The pri-
vate ownership of capital, unlike the ownership of slaves or land, was neither 
divine nor monopolized. In principle, anyone was free to become a capitalist. 
And this freedom, the combined outcome of the French Revolution and the 
Industrial Revolution, spelled a new political order. Prosperity no longer re-
quired submission to prince or king. Wealth no longer needed the blessing of 
the church. A new phenomenon, called economic growth, pushed these two insti-
tutions onto the sidelines. In contrast to pre-capitalist societies, which merely 
reproduced themselves, capital enabled society to expand and develop. For the 
first time in history, well-being depended not on redistribution through conflict, 
but on the peaceful and mutually beneficial operation of markets which allowed 
capital to increase the total pie.  
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these ideas made political econ-
omy a liberating ideology. But the world has changed since then, while basic 
principles of political economy have not. And so, eventually and inevitably, po-
litical economy, including its radical branches, became a conservative ‘disci-
pline.’ The specific ideologies and methods of political economy changed a 
great deal, of course. The Marxists, neoclassicists, neo-Marxist, Keynesians, 
neo-Ricardians and monetarists, all had something new to say. Their innova-
tions were numerous and included, among others, the dialectical method, the 
production function, mathematization, econometrics, the ‘macro’ economy, 
business economics and theories of finance. And yet, none of these approaches 
and techniques managed to transcend the mechanical cosmology of Newton 
and his generation. 
All branches of political economy remain anchored in the public-private 
duality. Regardless of their ideological persuasion, they all separate the ‘politi-
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rarely deviates from the iron laws of nature or history. All political economy is 
based on equilibrium (or its deviant, ‘disequilibrium’), which in turn requires 
common units and, therefore, an underlying immutable ‘substance.’ And in-
deed, when Milton Friedman declares that ‘there is no free lunch,’ he simply 
echoes Antoine Lavoisier, the eighteenth century French tax collector who in-
vented the Law of Conservation of Matter. Following Lavoisier, political 
economists, both Marxist and neoclassical, came to believe that there was ‘in-
trinsic equivalence’ in production and exchange. Value and utility, much like 
mass, could neither disappear nor be created out of thin air. The commodity’s 
value was ‘transformed’ labour and utility was ‘transformed’ productivity. Ac-
cording to this principle, ‘real’ and ‘financial’ capital were two sides of the same 
thing. The ‘machines’ on the left side of the balance sheet must, by definition, 
equal the ‘assets’ on the right hand side.  
These beliefs have become difficult to sustain in our day and age. Relativ-
ity, quantum physics, chaos theory and the invention of the hologram, to name 
a few, have challenged received notions of subjectivity and objectivity, space 
and time, substance and matter. Similarly, the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury beliefs in the ‘efficiency’ of markets, in the ‘democratizing’ impact of capi-
tal, and in the separation of ‘politics’ from ‘economics,’ seem a bit naïve at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century. The very categories of political economy – 
such as ‘labour’ and ‘capital,’ ‘market’ and ‘state,’ ‘production’ and ‘culture,’ 
‘value’ and ‘price’  – no longer have the definite meaning they once seemed to 
possessed. The massive anti-globalization movement and the growing revolt by 
economics students against the autistic teachings of their neoclassical textbooks 
are two manifestation of this breakdown. Heavy financing by government and 
business, collaboration from the universities and the tight grip of the ruling 
classes over the mass media help keep the edifice of political economy standing. 
But intellectually, it is a crumbling structure. 
The time is ripe for a change – and yet, change always offers both opportu-
nity and danger. The vacuum created by the inadequacies of political economy 
has been filled with postmodern ‘deconstruction’ of ‘instrumentalism,’ ‘culture’ 
and ‘identity.’ It is fashionable these days to fly to a conference in a modern jet, 
a high-tech computer on the lap, and write an article full of scorn against ‘mod-
ernity,’ ‘progress,’ the ‘enlightenment’ and ‘scientific truth.’ But this combina-
tion of arrogance and ignorance is not the way to go. 
It is true that human beings ‘invented’ physics and chemistry, along with 
the stars, the electron, radiation and everything else we ‘know’ about the world. 
It is also true that their quest was motivated by power as well as curiosity. But 
these inventions were not arbitrary, and all postmodernists know it full well – for 
otherwise they would not hesitate to put their heads into a working microwave 





















Political economy may be broken. It is certainly out of tune with social real-
ity and the many challenges to its mechanical world view. But postmodernism 
cannot fix these problems. The answer is not to abandon universalism, but to 
think of a better universal theory. Not to reject order, truth and harmony, but to 
look for them in a more open, democratic way. We need to revisit the core 
ideas of political economy against the context in which they evolved. We need 
to look at how the world has changed. And as we do so, we need to reinvent our 
categories and theories. Our task is not only to dismantle the old political econ-
omy, but to build a new one.  
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